Table of Content :rnrnVol. 16 Issue: 3, pp. 282 - 302, Managerial opportunism and real activities manipulation: evidence from option backdating firmsrnrnVol. 16 Issue: 3, pp. 303 - 321, Analyst ratings for firms filing for and reorganizing under Chapter 11rnrnVol. 16 Issue: 3, pp. 322 - 347, Real activities manipulation by bidders prior to mergers and acquisitionsrnrnVol. 16 Issue: 3, pp. 348 - 365, Does corporate social responsibility disclosure improve firm investment efficiency?: Evidence from ChinarnrnVol. 16 Issue: 3, pp. 366 - 384, Do managers manipulate earnings to influence credit rating agencies’ decisions?: Evidence from WatchlistrnrnVol. 16 Issue: 3, pp. 385 - 402, Information asymmetry and incentive contracting with the tax department